

DOES ARISTOTLE DISTINGUISH BETWEEN COMMON AND SPECIFIC *TOPOI* IN THE *RHETORIC*?*

MATYÁŠ HAVRDA

It has been a widely held and deeply seated view that, in *Rhetoric*, I,2 1358a1-35 (henceforth referred to as “the Passage”), Aristotle distinguishes between two kinds of *topoi*: the common and the specific. The view is first attested in the Byzantine anonymous commentary on the *Rhetoric*, dated to the 12th century, and endorsed by the majority of modern commentators, most notably by Edward Cope, William Grimaldi, and Christof Rapp.¹ However, scholars who agree that there is a distinction between common and specific *topoi* in the *Rhetoric* disagree as to what the distinction is. Cope believes that the specific *topoi* are such as pertain to individual arts and sciences, furnishing them with peculiar propositions and enthymemes. The common *topoi*, in contrast, are “those general topics of argument which are universally applicable to all sciences”.² Grimaldi thinks that the specificity of “particular topics”, as he calls them, is determined by a particular subject to which they belong: “They belong to the subject in itself and in all of its diverse relations. They represent the varied particular aspects

* This article was also published in an Open Access mode, under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Licence (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).

¹ Cf. already ANON. SEGUERIANUS, *Rhet.* 170, claiming that Aristotle distinguished “common” and “peculiar” *topoi*: Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ καὶ κοινούς καὶ ἰδίους τοὺς μὲν πλείστους εὔρηκε, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἰδίων διαλέγεται συμφωνῶν καὶ αὐτὸς Εὐδήμῳ τῷ ἀκαδημαϊκῷ. Seguerianus cites Neocles (1st/2nd cent. AD) as his source. However, it is unclear if the distinction should be read against the backdrop of the *Rhetoric*, or rather in light of the *Topics*, where common *topoi* would be those applicable to problems with different predicables; cf. ALEXANDER, *In Top.*, CAG II/2, 330,11-15 (on *Top.* IV,3 124a10), using the expression “common *topos*” in this sense.

² COPE 1867, 126.

of an individual subject which can throw light upon the subject and the field of knowledge which it represents.”³ Rapp, on the other hand, links the distinction between common and specific *topoi* to the division of rhetorical speeches into three kinds – the deliberative, epideictic, and juridical –, arguing that the specific *topoi* are specific to a particular kind of speech. This view goes back to Christoph Schrader,⁴ but Rapp refines it by introducing a second criterion – namely, that the specific *topoi* are derived from a particular understanding of a “basic concept” (*Grundbegriff*) pertaining to each kind of speeches.⁵ All these interpreters assume that Aristotle deals with the specific *topoi* in the first book, turning to the common *topoi* either in *Rhet.* II,22 or II,19. They disagree, however, about the content of the specific *topoi* and their relation to the common ones. Grimaldi believes that the specific *topoi* may be called “material”, as they offer the matter for propositions. The common *topoi*, on the other hand, present “forms for inference by syllogism”.⁶ So, even though rhetorical syllogisms are built on general *topoi*, nevertheless most of them find their material in the particular *topoi*.⁷ Rapp rejects this explanation, arguing rather that the function of the specific and the common *topoi* is the same – namely, to provide instructions on how to construct an argument in public speeches.⁸ This includes instructions about the patterns of such arguments. These patterns are partly similar to those found in the *Topics*, partly different, insofar as they are based on definitions of basic concepts pertaining to specific kinds of speeches.⁹ By describing the specific *topoi* as “argumentative patterns”,¹⁰ Rapp not only rejects Grimaldi’s distinction between the material and formal aspects of enthymemes, but also the earlier view of Friedrich Solmsen, according to which the items called “specific *topoi*” by scholars are not *topoi* at all, but simply premisses of categorical syllogisms, as opposed to syllogisms constructed from *topoi*.¹¹

³ GRIMALDI 1958, 9; cf. GRIMALDI 1980, 75–76.

⁴ SCHRADER 1674, 390.

⁵ RAPP 2002, II, 290–291.

⁶ GRIMALDI 1958, 9 and note 51.

⁷ GRIMALDI 1980, 76.

⁸ Cf. RAPP 2002, II, 282–284.

⁹ Cf. RAPP 2002, II, 266–269; 281–298, here esp. 291–294.

¹⁰ Cf. RAPP 2010, Appendix.

¹¹ SOLMSEN 1929, 14–22; cf. RAPP 2002, I, 333–334; II, 263–269.

In this paper I venture to challenge the state of the art on this issue, represented by Rapp's magisterial commentary.¹² While accepting Rapp's criticism of earlier attempts to tackle the problem of *topoi* in the *Rhetoric*, I argue that Aristotle does not distinguish between common and specific *topoi* in the Passage or anywhere else in the treatise. Rather, he distinguishes two sources of rhetorical deductions, one of them being *topoi* and the other definitions or definition-like accounts. Whereas the knowledge of *topoi* belongs to the expertise of a rhetor or a dialectician, definitions properly belong to specific arts and sciences. Both of these sources, I propose, are dealt with in *Rhet.* I,4–15, the same or additional *topoi* being then treated in their own right in II,19–23.¹³

1. Two Types of Enthymemes (1358a2–17) and Neuter Plurals:
ἴδια (1358a17), ἐκεῖνα (1358a21), ταῦτα (1358a23)

The Passage starts by setting out a “major difference between enthymemes” (τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων μεγίστη διαφορά) – a difference which, Aristotle notes, is “hidden to almost everyone” and pertains also to dialectical deductions:

Some of them are constructed according to rhetoric, just as [some dialectical deductions are constructed] according to dialectic, whereas others according to other arts and capacities, some already existent, others not obtained yet (*Rhet.* I,2 1358a4–6 = T1).¹⁴

I will refer to these two kinds of enthymemes as “R-enthymemes” (viz those constructed according to rhetoric) and “OA-enthymemes” (viz those constructed ac-

¹² RAPP 2002.

¹³ Unless indicated otherwise, I am quoting the text of the *Rhetoric* according to KASSEL 1976.

¹⁴ τὰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐστί κατὰ τὴν ῥητορικὴν ὥσπερ καὶ κατὰ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν [μέθοδον τῶν συλλογισμῶν], τὰ δὲ κατ' ἄλλας τέχνας καὶ δυνάμεις, τὰς μὲν οὖσας τὰς δ' οὐπω κατελιημμένας. I follow the text by COPE 1877, 48, according to some later mss. Cf. already SPENGLER 1867, 71. Kassel, followed by RAPP 2002, II, 212, brackets ὥσπερ καὶ κατὰ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν μέθοδον τῶν συλλογισμῶν on ll. 5–6; cf. a similar phrase on ll. 4–5. (This solution is already proposed by Muret, cf. SPENGLER 1867, 70). But it makes good sense for Aristotle to distinguish “other arts and faculties” from *both* rhetoric *and* dialectic (cf. ll. 10–11); moreover, the dittography of μέθοδον τῶν συλλογισμῶν is more easily explained if we suppose that τὴν διαλεκτικὴν had been in the *Vorlage*. For the arts “not obtained yet” cf. ARISTOTLE, *Cat.* 7, 7b31–33; STEPHANUS, *In Rhet.*, *CAG* XXI/2, 267,24–25 (*ad* ARIST. *Rhet.* I,2 1358a7).

cording to other arts), respectively. Since, for Aristotle, enthymemes are rhetorical deductions (*Rhet.* I,1 1355a6–8), I take it that the OA-enthymemes are rhetorical in the sense that they are used in rhetorical speeches, but they are constructed as deductions belonging to other arts.¹⁵ In a difficult sentence, Aristotle then appears to suggest that those who handle the OA-enthymemes “more properly” (μᾶλλον ... κατὰ τρόπον) pass from enthymemes to other sorts of arguments.¹⁶

In the next section, Aristotle further explains:

I mean that rhetorical and dialectical deductions are concerned with things with which we say the *τόποι* are concerned.¹⁷ These are the *τόποι* concerned with matters of justice and physics and politics and many other specifically different things in common, like the *τόπος* of “more and less”.¹⁸ Making a deduction or

¹⁵ Here, as in *SE* I,9 170a36, Aristotle speaks of “arts and capacities” (τέχνη καὶ δυνάμεις). As the context shows, the word “art” encompasses theoretical sciences, such as physics (cf. below, T2 and T3); the word “capacity” possibly refers specifically to the productive arts; cf. *Arist. Top.* I,2 101b5–7; *Met.* Θ,2 1046b2–3.

¹⁶ *Rhet.* I,2 1358a7–9: διὸ καὶ λαμβάνουσιν τε τοὺς ἀκροατὰς καὶ μᾶλλον ἀπτόμενοι κατὰ τρόπον μεταβαίνουσιν ἐξ αὐτῶν. The sentence is obscure, as Aristotle acknowledges (1358a9–10), but not ungrammatical. The majority of editors delete τοὺς ἀκροατὰς, Ross deletes μᾶλλον, Kassel posits lacuna after ἀκροατὰς and (following Muret) adds ἡ before κατὰ τρόπον. But perhaps the ms. reading can stand. Aristotle repeatedly points out that the borderline between the OA-enthymemes and deductions pertaining to the corresponding arts and sciences tends to escape notice; cf. *Rhet.* I,2 1358a24–25 and I,4 1359b14–15. Our line could suggest that the fuzzy status of the OA-enthymemes makes them “hidden to the audience” in the sense that it makes the audience uncertain whether the arguments they hear are rhetorical or belong to a determined field of knowledge (for the contrast cf. *Rhet.* I,1 1354a1–3). In the case of enthymemes based on *topoi* no such confusion can arise. κατὰ τρόπον means “properly”, “as is due”; the comparative μᾶλλον could then indicate that there are degrees of handling an enthymeme “properly”; cf. *Rhet.* I,2 1358a23, on selecting one’s premisses “better” (ὄσφ ... βέλτιον).

¹⁷ *Rhet.* I,2 1358a10–12: λέγω γὰρ διαλεκτικούς τε καὶ ῥητορικούς συλλογισμούς εἶναι περὶ ὧν τοὺς τόπους λέγομεν. I understand the elliptic phrase περὶ ὧν τοὺς τόπους λέγομεν in the sense of περὶ τῶν περὶ ὧν τοὺς τόπους λέγομεν (sc. εἶναι). What are the *topoi* “concerned with”? “The possible and the impossible”, “the greater and the less”, etc. Cf. e.g. *Rhet.* I,19 1391b28–31: πᾶσι γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον τῷ περὶ τοῦ δυνατοῦ καὶ ἀδυνατοῦ προσχρῆσθαι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ... ἔτι δὲ περὶ μεγέθους κοινὸν ἀπάντων ἐστὶ τῶν λόγων.

¹⁸ *Rhet.* I,2 1358a12–14: οὗτοι δ’ εἰσὶν οἱ κοινῇ (thus F, followed by Kassel; κοινοὶ A, followed by Spengel, Ross *et al.*) περὶ δικαίων καὶ φυσικῶν καὶ περὶ πολιτικῶν καὶ περὶ πολλῶν διαφερόντων εἶδει, οἷον ὁ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον τόπος. For the “common” applicability of *topoi*, cf. *ARIST. SE* 9, 170a34–36: δῆλον οὖν ὅτι οὐ πάντων τῶν ἐλέγχων ἀλλὰ τῶν παρὰ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ληπτέον τοὺς τόπους: οὗτοι γὰρ κοινοὶ πρὸς ἅπασαν τέχνην καὶ δύναμιν. For the *topos* of “more and less” cf. *ARIST. Rhet.* II,23 1397b12–27; II,19 1392b15–16; cf. *RAPP* 2002, II, 212–213. Cf. also *ARIST. Top.* III,6 119b17–30. It is one of the *topoi* applied across predicables; cf. *Top.* II,9 114b37–115a14 (accident), IV,6 127b18–25 (genus), V,8 137b14–27 (property).

an enthymeme from this τόπος about matters of justice will not be any easier than about matters of physics or anything else; and still they are specifically different (*Rhet.* I,1 1358a10–17 = T2).

Having explained the R-enthymemes and dialectical deductions in terms of τόποι, Aristotle then turns to something called “ἴδια”, “the peculiar ones”:

The peculiar ones are those [made] from premisses about a particular species and kind.¹⁹ Thus, for example, there are premisses concerning matters of physics, from which there is no enthymeme or deduction about matters of ethics, and other premisses about the matters of ethics, from which no enthymeme or deduction will be made about matters of physics. And the same holds of all [arts] (*Rhet.* I,1 1358a17–26 = T3).²⁰

What are the ἴδια? According to the standard view, Aristotle speaks of the specific τόποι, contrasted against the common τόποι by being “peculiar”.²¹ However, this interpretation is odd on three counts:

First, τόπος is a masculine, whereas ἴδιον is a neuter.²²

Second, the description of ἴδια as items made “from premisses” strongly suggests that they are conceived of as deductions. The same collocation is used in connection with deductions in the same passage; 1358a18–19: ἐξ ὧν οὔτε ἐνθύμημα οὔτε συλλογισμὸς ἔστι περὶ τῶν ἠθικῶν κτλ. I have found no instance

¹⁹ By “kinds” Aristotle appears to mean the objects of particular sciences taken as a whole (e.g. τὰ ἠθικά), by “species” more differentiated types of these objects (e.g. τὰ δίκαια). Cf. SOLMSEN 1929, 17 n. 1 and 18.

²⁰ ἴδια δέ, ὅσα ἐκ τῶν περὶ ἕκαστον εἶδος καὶ γένος προτάσεών ἐστιν, οἷον περὶ φυσικῶν εἰσι προτάσεις ἐξ ὧν οὔτε ἐνθύμημα οὔτε συλλογισμὸς ἔστι περὶ τῶν ἠθικῶν, καὶ περὶ τούτων ἄλλαι ἐξ ὧν οὐκ ἔσται περὶ τῶν φυσικῶν· ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτ' ἔχει ἐπὶ πάντων. κάκεῖνα μὲν οὐ ποιήσει περὶ οὐδὲν γένος ἔμφρονα· περὶ οὐδὲν γὰρ ὑποκειμένον ἐστιν· ταῦτα δέ, ὅσῳ τις ἂν βέλτιον ἐκλέγηται τὰς προτάσεις, λήσει ποιήσας ἄλλην ἐπιστήμην τῆς διαλεκτικῆς καὶ ῥητορικῆς· ἂν γὰρ ἐντύχη ἀρχαῖς, οὐκέτι διαλεκτικὴ οὐδὲ ῥητορικὴ ἀλλ' ἐκείνη ἔσται ἣς ἔχει τὰς ἀρχάς.

²¹ Thus COPE 1867, 126; GRIMALDI 1958, 8–9 and n. 46; GRIMALDI 1980, 74; RAPP 2002, II, 208–211.

²² This is not a decisive obstacle, but it weakens the case of the standard view nevertheless. For neuter plurals denoting a subject of a different gender, cf. GRIMALDI 1958, 9 n. 46 (after ROEMER 1884, 506), citing two parallels in the *Rhetoric*: (1) *Rhet.* II,21 1395a10–12: χρῆσθαι δὲ δεῖ καὶ ταῖς θερυλημέναις καὶ κοιναῖς γνώμαις, ἐὰν ὧσι χρήσιμοι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ εἶναι κοινά..., where κοινά is a neuter predicate linked to a feminine subject. However, even though κοινά (printed by Kassel) is attested by the earliest ms. (A), F has the equally plausible κοιναί (printed by Ross); for the syntax cf. ARIST. *Aud.* 800a34: διὰ γὰρ τὸ εἶναι σκληρὸς (sc. ὁ πνεύμων) ... (2) *Rhet.* I,2 1355b35–38: τῶν δὲ πίστευον αἱ μὲν ἄτεχνοί εἰσιν αἱ δ' ἐντεχνοί. ἄτεχνα δὲ λέγω

in Aristotle, where sentences described as being “from προτάσεις” (whether we translate it as “from premisses” or “from propositions”) would not be deductions. However, if τόποι were deductions, it would be hard to distinguish them from enthymemes. Yet, in *Rhet.* II,22 1395b21–22, Aristotle says explicitly that τόπος and enthymeme are two different things: ἄλλο γὰρ εἶδος ἐκάτερον τούτων ἐστίν.²³ In any case, as far as I can see, nowhere else in the *Rhetoric* does Aristotle describe τόποι of any sort as coming about “from premisses”.

Finally, the standard view makes it rather unclear why the distinction between R- and OA-enthymemes is introduced in the first place and what the connection between that distinction and the one between common and specific τόποι should be. Does Aristotle mean to say that some τόποι are constructed from premisses belonging to other arts than rhetoric? But why would he need to make a distinction between two sorts of *enthymemes* to make this simple point – a point that, moreover, does not seem to play any role in the subsequent discussion?

As far as the neuter form of ἴδια is concerned, the proponents of the standard view argue that it appears less striking when we realize that the subject of the subsequent sentence, which – as they take it – surely refers to the common τόποι, has exactly the same form: a deictic pronoun in the neuter plural (ἐκείνα), whose counterpart in the next sentence (ταῦτα) again refers to the ἴδια:

And *those* mentioned previously will not make [anyone] knowledgeable about any kind; for they are not about any subject. But as far as *these* are concerned, the better one succeeds in selecting the premisses, the more one will, unknow-

ὅσα μὴ δι’ ἡμῶν πεπόρισται ἀλλὰ προῦπήρχεν, οἷον μάρτυρες βάσανοι συγγραφῶν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ἐντεχνῶν δὲ ὅσα... However, in this case, the neuter plurals do not refer directly to a subject of a different gender.

²³ In Rapp’s view the specific *topoi* are constructed from premisses in the same way as enthymemes. As a matter of fact, his interpretation of the standard form of the specific *topoi* (“X is good, *because* it is so-and-so”) presents them effectively as enthymemes (cf. RAPP 2002, II, 225–226 and 291–294). It may be objected, however, that, in the above-quoted sentence, Aristotle rejects this equivalence. To anticipate the argument of this paper: It is true that in Aristotle’s account, the premisses based on definitions are typically linked to these definitions by means of explanatory clauses. Yet it is questionable whether these clauses are part of argument schemes analogous to *topoi*. In the *Topics*, the explanatory (γάρ-) clauses typically link particular instructions or examples to the *topoi* on which they are based; cf. e.g. *Top.* IV,1 121b15–17, where an instruction is γάρ-linked to the *topos*: “The genus of all things which are specifically different is the same”, or 121b24–30, where an instruction and an example are linked to the *topos*: “When one species falls under two genera, the one is included in the other.” In the *Rhetoric*, in those parts of I,4–14 where premisses are based on definitions, the functional equivalents to these *topoi* are definitions, rather than argument schemes.

ingly, bring about knowledge different from dialectic and rhetoric. Should he hit upon the principles, the deduction will no longer be dialectical or rhetorical, but it will belong to that [science] the principles of which he has (*Rhet.* I,1 1358a21–26 = T4).²⁴

However, these sentences do not support the contention that Aristotle speaks about two sorts of τόποι at all. Clearly the part about ταῦτα (“these”), which does refer to the ἴδια, rephrases the point made earlier about the OA-enthymemes: one who handles these enthymemes “more properly” will pass to a different sort of argument. “Handling” an enthymeme “more properly” is probably equivalent to selecting one’s premisses “better”: by selecting the premisses better, one produces a better argument, an argument which, unlike the R-enthymemes, brings about knowledge. Now in T4 this capacity of producing knowledge is contrasted against the failure of the first mentioned items (ἐκεῖνα) to “make anyone knowledgeable about any kind”. According to the standard view, these items are the common τόποι. Yet, it seems more natural to read the passage against the backdrop of the distinction between R- and OA-enthymemes, namely as describing a contrast between two sorts of arguments. But if T4 describes a contrast between two sorts of arguments, why should we think that the neuter plurals refer to οἱ τόποι (in the masculine) rather than directly to τὰ ἐνθυμήματα (in the neuter)? After all, the whole section 1358a1–26 (= T1–4) is introduced as an explanation of the difference between R- and OA-enthymemes: Aristotle starts by defining the R-enthymemes (and their dialectical counterparts) in terms of τόποι, on whose basis one may argue about any subject matter. In contrast, he says, the peculiar ἐνθυμήματα (i.e. the OA-enthymemes) are those argued from premisses pertaining to particular species and kinds. The former do not produce knowledge, whereas the latter may do so. To sum up, there are good reasons to think that ἴδια and ἐκεῖνα refer not to the specific and common τόποι, but to the OA- and R-enthymemes, respectively.²⁵

²⁴ κάκεῖνα μὲν οὐ ποιήσει περὶ οὐδὲν γένος ἔμφορον· περὶ οὐδὲν γὰρ ὑποκειμένον ἐστὶν ταῦτα δέ, ὅσῳ τις ἂν βέλτιον ἐκλέγηται τὰς προτάσεις, λήσει ποιήσας ἄλλην ἐπιστήμην τῆς διαλεκτικῆς καὶ ῥητορικῆς· ἂν γὰρ ἐντύχη ἄρχαῖς, οὐκέτι διαλεκτικὴ οὐδὲ ῥητορικὴ ἀλλ’ ἐκείνη ἔσται ἣς ἔχει τὰς ἀρχάς.

²⁵ Thus MARX 1900, 281 n. 2, 283 and 296; SOLMSEN 1929, 15. Stephanus, the Byzantine commentator on Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, seems to understand the subject of ἴδια in the same way. This is his paraphrase of *Rhet.* I,2 1358a10–21: εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ κοινὰ ἐνθυμήματα, ὧν εἰσὶν οἱ τόποι κοινοί, οἷον ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ μᾶλλον, ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἧττον καὶ τῶν τοιῶνδε. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἴδια ἐνθυμήματα τὰ φυσικοῖς μόνοις φέρε εἰπεῖν προσήκοντα καὶ ἄλλα ἴδια τὰ ἠθικοῖς (*CAG XXI/2*, 297,19–22). Cf. also ANONYMOUS, *In Rhet.*, *CAG XXI/2*, 8,36–9,1: ἴδια δὲ ἐπιχειρήματα καὶ πίστεις, ὅσα εἰσὶν ἐκ τῶν οἰκείων ἐκάστω εἶδει καὶ ὑποκειμένῳ προτάσεων. Interestingly, Anonymous

2. εἶδη and τόποι (1358a26-33)

However, there is no doubt that the διαφορά ἐνθυμημάτων in the Passage serves the purpose of distinguishing two sorts of items on which enthymemes are based and that this distinction introduces much of the agenda of books I and II. Aristotle calls these items “εἶδη” and “τόποι” respectively, and describes τόποι as “common” (κοινά), as opposed to “particular and peculiar” εἶδη. Is it perhaps at this point that the distinction between common and specific *topoi* is made? Let us look at the text first:

The majority of enthymemes are delivered from these εἶδη, i.e. those that are partial and peculiar, fewer of them from the common items. Thus, as has been done in the *Topics*, here too, in dealing with the enthymemes, we must distinguish the εἶδη and the τόποι from which they are to be obtained. By εἶδη I mean the peculiar premisses belonging to each kind, by τόποι the items common to all alike (*Rhet.* I,1 1358a26-32 = T5).²⁶

This passage is puzzling in at least two ways: the notion of εἶδη as something “from which” enthymemes are delivered is introduced for the first time; yet it is presented as something already known. Furthermore, there does not seem to be any passage in the *Topics*, where εἶδη and τόποι are distinguished along these lines. As to the first point, even though the word εἶδη is used for the first time in the required sense, its content has already been mentioned in connection with the notion of ἴδια, items made “from premisses about a particular species and kind”. The ἴδια, I have argued, are the enthymemes peculiar to a particular kind and the description of their premisses corresponds closely to the notion of εἶδη.

The reference to the *Topics* is notoriously obscure. SPENGLER (1867, 74) suggests a number of passages, the most interesting of which being *SE* 9 and *Top.* I,14. In the first passage, Aristotle draws a distinction between two types of refutation: one peculiar to each science and based on its principles, and one belonging to dialectic and based on common τόποι. In Aristotle’s view, it is hopeless

interprets ἐκεῖνα in *ARIST. Rhet.* I,2 1358a21 as common τόποι: κακεῖνα μὲν, οἱ κοινῶς πᾶσιν εφαρμόζοντες τόποι... (*In Rhet.*, *CAG* XXI/2, 9,7).

²⁶ ἔστι δὲ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων ἐκ τούτων τῶν εἰδῶν λεγόμενα τῶν κατὰ μέρος καὶ ἰδίων, ἐκ δὲ τῶν κοινῶν ἐλάττω. καθάπερ οὖν καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς, καὶ ἐνταῦθα διαιρετέον τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων τὰ τε εἶδη καὶ τοὺς τόπους ἐξ ὧν ληπτέον. λέγω δ’ εἶδη μὲν τὰς καθ’ ἕκαστον γένος ἰδίας προτάσεις, τόπους δὲ τοὺς κοινούς ὁμοίως πάντων.

to try to grasp the full extent of things according to which refuted arguments are being refuted. ... For, some refutations will correspond to the principles of geometry and their conclusions, some to those of medicine, others to those of other sciences.

Thus, as dialecticians,

we should grasp the *τόποι* pertaining not to all refutations, but to refutations in accordance with dialectic. For these are common to every art and faculty. And whereas studying the refutation pertaining to each science is the task of the one who has mastered that science ... studying the refutation from the common items, which does not fall under any art, is the task of dialecticians.²⁷

As Aristotle points out, refutation is a demonstration of the contradictory (*SE* 9, 170b1–2), and thus the distinction between refutations peculiar to each science and those belonging to dialectic is a distinction between two types of deductions: one from the principles of sciences and the other from the common *τόποι*. This seems to run parallel to the division of the two types of enthymemes in T1–4 and thus also to the division of their respective sources: premisses peculiar to an art or science on the one hand, and the *τόποι* on the other.

The second passage, *Top.* I,14, deals with the “tools by means of which we may be well equipped with deductions” (*Top.* I,13 105a21–22). These tools are four in number, but they may all be reduced to the task of obtaining premisses regarding possible problems (105a22–33); these, in turn, may be divided into three “parts” (μέρη): ethical, physical, and logical (I,14 105b19–21). Aristotle indicates a number of sources from which premisses can be obtained, including opinions corresponding to arts (δόξαι κατὰ τέχνας, *Top.* I,14 105b1). In addition,

one should also collect premisses from written works, and make up tables, listing them separately about each kind, e.g. about good or about animal, and

²⁷ ARIST. *SE* 9, 170a20–21, 27–29 and 34–39: Παρὰ πόσα δ' ἐλέγχονται οἱ ἐλεγχοίμενοι, οὐ δεῖ πειρᾶσθαι λαμβάνειν (...) οἱ μὲν γὰρ (*scil.* ἐλεγχοί) ἔσονται παρὰ τὰς ἐν γεωμετρίας ἀρχάς καὶ τὰ τούτων συμπεράσματα, οἱ δὲ παρὰ τὰς ἐν ἰατρικῇ, οἱ δὲ παρὰ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν. (...) δῆλον οὖν ὅτι οὐ πάντων τῶν ἐλέγχων ἀλλὰ τῶν παρὰ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ληπτέον τοὺς τόπους· οὗτοι γὰρ κοινοὶ πρὸς ἅπασαν τέχνην καὶ δύναμιν. καὶ τὸν μὲν καθ' ἑκάστην ἐπιστήμην ἔλεγχον τοῦ ἐπιστήμονός ἐστι θεωρεῖν (...), τὸν δ' ἐκ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ ὑπὸ μηδεμίαν τέχνην τῶν διαλεκτικῶν.

about all [sorts of] good, beginning with what it is (*Top.* I,14 105b12-15; trans. Smith, modified).²⁸

Arguably the items whose acquisition is discussed in this and the following chapters of the *Topics* have much in common with the premisses from which the peculiar enthymemes are made according to T3-4. For, the latter premisses are also being “selected” (*Rhet.* I,2 1358a23: ἐκλέγεται); and they are related to a particular species and kind (1358a17-18: περὶ ἕκαστον εἶδος καὶ γένος). Considering that Aristotle describes the εἶδη of enthymemes as “the premisses peculiar to each kind” (1358a31), it is hard to escape the impression that they, too, are the sort of items discussed in *Top.* I,14.²⁹

This connection is further supported by the following consideration. At the beginning of *Rhet.* II, Aristotle summarizes the contents of book I with these words:

Such, then, are the things from which we must exhort and dissuade, and praise and blame, and accuse and defend, and such opinions and premisses are useful for the proofs thereabout. For these are things that enthymemes must be concerned with and come from, so as to speak peculiarly to each kind of speeches.³⁰

Here again, Aristotle speaks about items “from which” enthymemes are made, mentioning them alongside with “opinions and premisses” (δόξαι καὶ προτάσεις). Even though the items “from which” could be regarded as different from “opinions and premisses”,³¹ it seems more likely that they are the same things. For, later in the second book, before turning to the “common” items, Aristotle once again describes the subject matter of *Rhet.* I,4-14 as “opinions and premisses”, pointing out that the deliberative, epideictic, and juridical speeches draw their respective proofs “from them” (*Rhet.* II,18 1391b23-27).

²⁸ ἐκλέγειν δὲ χρὴ καὶ ἐκ τῶν γεγραμμένων λόγων, τὰς δὲ διαγραφὰς ποιεῖσθαι περὶ ἑκάστου γένους ὑποτιθέντας χωρὶς, οἷον περὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ περὶ ζώου, καὶ περὶ ἀγαθοῦ παντός, ἀρξάμενον ἀπὸ τοῦ τί ἐστίν.

²⁹ Cf. GRIMALDI 1980, 74, and esp. RUBINELLI 2009, 65-66. Another reference to the *Topics* appears in *Rhet.* II,22 1396b4, where it probably pertains to *Top.* I,14 105b13-18. Cf. RAPP 2002, II, 746, with reservations.

³⁰ *Rhet.* II,1 1377b16-20: Ἐκ τίνων μὲν οὖν δεῖ καὶ προτρέπειν καὶ ἀποτρέπειν καὶ ἐπαινεῖν καὶ φέγειν καὶ κατηγορεῖν καὶ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, καὶ ποῖαι δόξαι καὶ προτάσεις χρήσιμοι πρὸς τὰς τούτων πίστεις, ταῦτ' ἐστίν· περὶ γὰρ τούτων καὶ ἐκ τούτων τὰ ἐνθυμήματα, ὡς περὶ ἕκαστον εἰπεῖν ἰδίᾳ τὸ γένος τῶν λόγων.

³¹ Cf. RAPP 2002, II, 525-526, leaving the question open.

Turning to *Rhet.* I,4–14, we can see that Aristotle does indeed engage in the process of selecting “opinions and premisses” suitable to the three kinds of rhetoric. What is the relation between these items and those he describes as εἶδη, putting them in contrast to τόποι in T5? To answer this question, we must review the agenda of these chapters briefly. Starting from chapter 4, Aristotle proceeds roughly as follows: Taking the goals of each kind of speeches as starting-points, he identifies the most general predicates pertaining to these goals, investigates what they are, and sets out the sufficient conditions for any item to qualify as their subject. For example, the goal of the deliberative kind of rhetoric is the choice of the expedient and the avoidance of the harmful (I,3 1358b21–22). After a preliminary discussion of the ultimate goal of any deliberate action – namely, happiness – Aristotle identifies the “expedient” (τὸ συμφέρον) as the proper object of deliberation (I,6 1362a17–20). In order to grasp the “expedient”, he then turns to the notion of the “good”, exploring what it is and what things qualify as “good” (1362a20–63b4). Among things good, he further distinguishes those agreed to be good (1362b10–29) and the disputable cases (1362b29–63b3). Finally, he rounds out the investigation by asking what things are “better” (I,6 1363b5–I,7; 1365b19). In this way, Aristotle supplies a list of items that can be described as “opinions”, insofar as they rely on what people “agree” (ὁμολογοῦσιν) to be the case (cf. I,5 1360b18); and those that may be described as “premisses” or “propositions”, insofar as they predicate something of something.

Yet the items on the list are a mixed bag. Some are definitions, grasping something of what the definiendum is (e.g. “good” is “that which is choice-worthy for its own sake”); others are accounts pointing to the things at issue indirectly, by means of predicates other than their own (e.g. “that to which the contrary is evil is good”; “that to which the contrary is expedient to enemies is good”; “that of which there is no excess is good”); some are more like inference schemes, expressed by means of conditional statements (e.g. “if the greatest of those surpasses the greatest of these, then those surpass these”; this is greater than that, “when that follows on this, but not this on that”).³² Finally, most of the above are followed by sentences, in which the predicate at issue is supplied with an appropriate subject. When based on definitions, these sentences are usually simple propositions followed by an explanatory clause, which signals the definition on which they are based (e.g. “happiness is good, since it is

³² These examples are found in: *Rhet.* I,6 1362a21–22; 1362b30–32; 1363a1; I,7 1363b21–22; 1363b27–28.

something choiceworthy for its own sake”; I,6 1362b10–11). When based on indirect accounts or inference schemes, the sentences simply replace their more general elements with more particular ones, often rephrasing the inference in the form of a conditional statement (e.g. “if it is expedient to the enemies of the city that citizens are cowards, then courage is expedient to the citizens”; “if the biggest man is bigger than the biggest woman, then men are generally bigger than women”).³³

A question arises which of these items Aristotle refers to as “opinions and premisses” and which of them qualify as εἶδη. Plainly not all of them are peculiar to a single kind of speeches or, for that matter, to a single art or science. Moreover, there are reasons to think that Aristotle regarded some of them as τόποι. For, some of the inferences about the greater good, listed in chapter I,7, are paralleled in the third book of the *Topics*, where they are called “τόποι”.³⁴ They are sentences about “greatness and smallness” or “the greater and the less”, mentioned in *Rhet.* I,3 and again in II,18 and II,19, where they are described as “the common items” (τὰ κοινά). As Aristotle notes in *Rhet.* II,18 1391b31–92b1, “[the one] about greatness is common to all kinds of speeches. For all of these kinds use attenuation and amplification whether deliberating, praising or blaming, accusing or defending.”³⁵ Another common item, first mentioned in *Rhet.* I,3, is the one about the possible and the impossible (1359a11–12 and 15). This, too, is used already in connection with one kind of rhetoric, namely the juridical. Even though, in *Rhet.* I,12, Aristotle refers a fuller discussion of “what sort of things appear possible and what impossible” (1372a9–10) to a later occasion, as it is common to all kinds of speeches,³⁶ nevertheless he applies this *topos* to the use of juridical speeches, namely to produce premisses about the possibility of committing injustice. Arguably, the same *topos* is used in *Rhet.* I,6, where Aristotle applies the predicate “good” to “all that is deliberately chosen” and, since people deliberately choose things that are possible, he proceeds by investigating which sorts of things are possible (1363a19–b3). These include things easy to accomplish (εὐκατέργαστα), one of them being those “whereby they

³³ *Rhet.* I,6 1362b32–33; I,7 1363b23–24.

³⁴ Cf. RAPP 2002, II, 365–366, emphasizing this point against the view that *Rhet.* I is simply a collection of premisses.

³⁵ ἔτι δὲ περὶ μεγέθους κοινὸν πάντων ἐστὶ τῶν λόγων· χρῶνται γὰρ πάντες τῷ μειοῦν καὶ αὐξεῖν καὶ συμβουλευόντες καὶ ἐπαινοῦντες ἢ ψέγοντες καὶ κατηγοροῦντες ἢ ἀπολογούμενοι.

³⁶ The *topos* comes up in *Rhet.* II,19.

will gratify friends and incur hatred of enemies” (1363a33–34). Later he seems to refer back to this premiss as being derived from a *τόπος*.³⁷

None of this should surprise us. For, in *Rhet.* I,3, Aristotle indicates that he would employ the common *topoi* in connection with the three kinds of speeches. Having distinguished these three kinds, he turns to the objects with which they are concerned. They include: the goal (1358b20–29), “the possible and the impossible”, “the past and the future”, and “the greater and the less” (1359a11–26). As announced in *Rhet.* II,18, Aristotle deals with the last three objects separately in II,19, after he has gone through the “opinions and premisses” pertaining to each kind of speeches (II,18 1391b23–92a1). Nonetheless, in I,3, he says something else: he will deal with *each of these objects* (περὶ ἐκάστου τούτων) with respect to each of the three kinds of rhetoric.³⁸ By employing the *topos* of “the greater and the less” and “the possible and the impossible” in the first book, he seems to be doing precisely that.

When used in *Rhet.* I, the role of these *topoi* plainly is to generate premisses suitable to each of the three kinds of speeches. That is presumably why Aristotle says, in *Rhet.* II,22, that “one and the most important way of selecting premisses is this, the topical”.³⁹ He makes this statement in hindsight, referring to what has been discussed earlier,⁴⁰ before turning to the “elements” (στοιχεῖα), that is to say, the *τόποι*, in their own right, divided into two sorts – deictic and elenctic –, irrespective of specific kinds of rhetoric. In the same passage he also refers explicitly to the *τόποι*, “from which one ought to derive the enthymemes about the good and the bad, the noble and the base, the just and the unjust” (1396b31–33). This of course is a reference to the specific goals of the three kinds

³⁷ *Rhet.* I,15 1376a29–32, referring, presumably, to *Rhet.* I,6 1363a33–34 and 1363a20–21 (for the latter, cf. *Rhet.* I,6 1362b31–32).

³⁸ *Rhet.* I,3 1359a27–29: “Next we must separately draw distinctions about each of these, namely [distinguish] with which [of these] the deliberative, epideictic, and juridical speeches are concerned, respectively” (μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα διαρετέον ἰδίᾳ περὶ ἐκάστου τούτων, οἷον περὶ ὧν συμβουλή καὶ περὶ ὧν οἱ ἐπιδεικτικοὶ λόγοι, τρίτον δὲ περὶ ὧν αἱ δίκαι). The phrase περὶ ἐκάστου τούτων – which picks up on περὶ ὧν ... δεῖ λαβεῖν τὰς προτάσεις in 1359a26–27 – refers to the four objects mentioned above; cf. 1359a6–7: φανερόν δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι ἀνάγκη περὶ τούτων [sc. τῶν τελῶν] ἔχειν πρῶτον τὰς προτάσεις, 1359a14–16: ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τῷ συμβουλευόντι καὶ τῷ δικαζομένῳ καὶ τῷ ἐπιδεικτικῷ ἔχειν προτάσεις περὶ δυνατοῦ καὶ ἀδυνατοῦ, καὶ εἰ γέγονεν ἢ μή, καὶ εἰ ἔσται ἢ μή, 1359a22–24: δῆλον ὅτι δύο ἂν καὶ περὶ μεγέθους καὶ μικρότητος καὶ τοῦ μείζονος καὶ τοῦ ἐλάττονος προτάσεις ἔχειν.

³⁹ *Rhet.* II,22 1396b20–21: εἷς μὲν οὖν τρόπος τῆς ἐκλογῆς πρῶτος οὗτος ὁ τοπικός.

⁴⁰ Cf. RAPP 2002, II, 747.

of rhetoric, which indicates, in no uncertain terms, that τόποι are involved in the discovery of premisses concerning these goals.⁴¹

We have already seen how this applies to the parts where Aristotle produces premisses concerning the greater and the less, and the possible and the impossible. Apparently, however, he takes the liberty of using the appropriate τόποι in other cases as well. For example, the disputed case of whether courage is expedient for the citizens is settled on the basis of the above-mentioned principle: “That to which the contrary is expedient to enemies, is good.” This is derived from a more general principle: “That to which the contrary is evil, is good” (*Rhet.* I,6 1362b30–33). This, in turn, is an application of the rule that “contrary belongs to the contrary” (τῷ ἐναντίῳ τὸ ἐναντίον ὑπάρχει), described as a τόπος in *Rhet.* II,23 1397a8 and paralleled also in *Topics*, II,8 113b27–28. Unlike in *Rhet.* II,23, of course, the rule is formulated in a more specific way (actually: in two ways of descending generality), so as to suit the purpose of the deliberative kind of speech. In effect, it could be described as a “specific *topos*”. But, in spite of the standard view, there seems to be no indication in the *Rhetoric* that Aristotle described it like that. Similarly, in *Topics*, III,5, Aristotle allows for more and less general ways of “grasping” the same τόποι, without suggesting that the name “τόπος” should be reserved only to the most general formula.

On the other hand, it seems that, for Aristotle, not all premisses of rhetorical arguments are derived from the τόποι. Many seem to follow directly from the goals of each kind of rhetoric, or rather from the definitions of predicates pertaining to these goals. Thus, a number of subjects qualify as “good” according to these definitions of the “good”: “that which is choiceworthy for its own sake”; “that for the sake of which we choose something else”; “that which is the aim of all things”, or “of all things possessing perception or reason”, or “should they acquire reason” (I,6 1362a21–29). One predicate pertaining to the goal of the juridical kind is “pleasant” – for unjust deeds are committed for the sake of pleasure or something pleasant. Again, the definitions of “pleasure” (“a particular motion of the soul, namely, a sudden and perceptible settling down to its natural state”) and of “the pleasant” (“that which brings about such a condition”) produce a number of premisses regarding this issue (I,11). Interestingly, Aristotle calls these definitions “elements” (στοιχεῖα),⁴² applying

⁴¹ See again RAPP 2002, II, 749.

⁴² Cf. *Rhet.* I,6 1362a17–21: ἐπεὶ δὲ πρόκειται τῷ συμβουλευόντι σκοπὸς τὸ συμφέρον ... ληπτέον ἂν εἴη τὰ στοιχεῖα περὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ συμφέροντος ἀπλῶς. The word στοιχεῖα probably refers to the definitions produced in 1362a21–29. Aristotle later refers to them as things “laid down”: τούτων δὲ κειμένων... (1362a34).

to them the same name he applies to the *τόποι*.⁴³ Does it mean that he regards these definitions as *τόποι*? Probably not. For, there is a fundamental difference between definitions and *τόποι*, even the “specific” ones: Although *τόποι* may be applied to a specific content, they are not limited to a particular kind in their own right. Definitions, in contrast, are necessarily limited to a particular kind.⁴⁴

Now, even though, when speaking of “kinds”, Aristotle usually has in mind the three kinds of speeches,⁴⁵ the kinds with which rhetoric is concerned are limited also in another way. For, rhetorical arguments are generally concerned with deliberate action, which is the subject matter of ethics. Thus, insofar as rhetoric draws its premisses from the goals of deliberate action, it operates within the limits of ethics. For this reason Aristotle says that rhetoric is composed, on the hand, from the “analytic science”, and, on the other, from “the part of political science concerned with character”, that is to say, ethics. In the former respect, Aristotle adds, rhetoric resembles dialectic or sophistic;⁴⁶ this is plainly because it employs dialectical techniques of reasoning or their deficient forms. These techniques surely include the employment of *τόποι*, the ability to argue about the possible and the impossible, the greater and the less, etc., in addition to arguments peculiar to ethics. This brings us back to the distinction between R- and OA-enthymemes. The former deal with things with which the *τόποι* are concerned. The latter are limited to a particular kind (I,2 1358a4–7 and 10–21). However, the kinds according to which the OA-enthymemes are limited cannot be those of rhetorical speeches. For the enthymemes based on *τόποι* also belong to one of the kinds of rhetoric, and thus they are also limited by the goals of these kinds.⁴⁷ The difference, then, between the two types of enthymemes consists in something else. Even though both are limited by the goals of a par-

⁴³ Cf. *Rhet.* II,22 1396b22; II,26 1403a18.

⁴⁴ In this respect, the contrast between definitions and *topoi* is similar to the one between definitions and axioms in the theory of demonstration; cf. e.g. ARISTOTLE, *An. Post.* I,10 76a37–41; I,33 88b27–29.

⁴⁵ Cf. *Rhet.* I,2 1358a33–35; I,3 1358b7; II,1 1377b20; II,18 1391b23.

⁴⁶ *Rhet.* I,4 1359b9–12: ἡ ῥητορικὴ σύγκειται μὲν ἕκ τε τῆς ἀναλυτικῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἦθη πολιτικῆς, ὁμοία δ’ ἐστὶν τὰ μὲν τῇ διαλεκτικῇ τὰ δὲ τοῖς σοφιστικοῖς λόγοις. Kassel brackets πολιτικῆς, which could have entered the text as a gloss based on *Rhet.* I,2 1356a25–27: ὥστε συμβαίνει τὴν ῥητορικὴν οἷον παραφνές τι τῆς διαλεκτικῆς εἶναι καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἦθη πραγματείας, ἣν δίκαιόν ἐστι προσαγορεύειν πολιτικὴν. Cf. RAPP 2002, II, 314. On the other hand, there is no reason why Aristotle should not describe ethics as “that [part of] politics, which is concerned with character”.

⁴⁷ As Aristotle puts it with regard to the *topos* of the more and the less, “since the goal set before us according to each kind of speeches is some good, namely the expedient, the noble,

ticular kind of speech, one of them argues from certain τόποι – more precisely, from premisses discovered by means of these τόποι –, whereas the other from premisses peculiar to an art, specifically to the ethical part of politics. Corresponding to this is a distinction between two sorts of “elements”, from which the premisses of the two sorts of enthymemes are derived: one sort are definitions peculiar to ethics, the other sort are τόποι.

What, then, are the εἶδη? Aristotle says that they are “premisses peculiar to each kind” (I,2 1358a31). Does he mean the kinds of rhetoric, or the kinds of arts or sciences? The latter appears more likely, for the following reasons: The notion of εἶδη is introduced before the division of the three kinds of rhetoric is made; the expression ἐκ τούτων τῶν εἰδῶν in 1358a27 clearly refers to premisses of particular arts, mentioned in 1358a17–21. Furthermore, it is hard to see why premisses pertaining to one kind of rhetoric could not be used in the service of another. For example, although the premiss “virtue is good” is justified in the context of the deliberative rhetoric (I,6 1362b2–5), it is also used in the context of the epideictic, in support of the claim that “virtue is noble” (I,9 1366a35–36). As a matter of fact, Aristotle signals that *all* premisses pertaining to the deliberative kind may be adapted to the epideictic by simply changing the form of expression from exhortation to praise; cf. *Rhet.* I,9 1367b30–37: ἔχει δὲ κοινὸν εἶδος ὁ ἔπαινος καὶ αἱ συμβουλαί. Thus it is more likely that εἶδη are peculiar to arts and sciences, rather than kinds of speeches, *this* being the point of difference between them and the τόποι.⁴⁸

Apparently, then, by juxtaposing εἶδη and τόποι as two sources from which enthymemes are drawn (1358a29–32), Aristotle continues the line of thought started by the distinction of the two types of enthymemes (1358a2–17). Having distinguished these two types and their sources, he now turns to enthymemes

and the just, plainly amplifications must be obtained by means of these [goals] in all [the speeches]. Searching further beyond that concerning magnitude and superiority as such would be empty talk” (II,19 1393a13–17).

⁴⁸ Why are they called εἶδη? Rapp, who believes that εἶδη are the specific *topoi*, interestingly suggests that Aristotle’s terminology is modelled on the Isocratic use of the word ἰδέα in the sense of a “pattern” of argument designed for a particular purpose; cf. ISOCRATES, *Helen*, 15 (the patterns of defense as opposed to praise); *Busiris*, 33 (the pattern of praise as opposed to blame); *Philippus*, 143 (the mode of comparison, designed for praise); cf. also ARIST. *Poet.* 19, 1456b2–4; RAPP 2002, II, 214; RAPP 2016, 180 n. 1. As a matter of fact, the Isocratic use of ἰδέα seems to befit such rhetorical strategies as “amplification” (ἀϋξησης, τὸ ἀϋξεῖν), described by Aristotle as one of the “common εἶδη” of rhetoric; cf. *Rhet.* I,9 1368a26–27; II,18 1392a4–5. However, as Aristotle emphasizes in *Rhet.* II,26 1403a16–23, ἀϋξεῖν is *not* a *topos*, but a particular enthymeme. Another option, suggested by SOLMSEN 1929, 17 n. 3, is that εἶδη are so called metonymically from the “species” to which they belong (e.g. ἀγαθόν, καλόν, δίκαιον); cf. *Rhet.* I,2 1358a17 and note 19 above.

in general, pointing out that they are drawn either from premisses peculiar to a particular science or from the common *τόποι*. This interpretation, however, impinges on a major obstacle. For, in the next sentence, Aristotle announces that he will deal with the *εἶδη* *first*.⁴⁹ This is commonly understood as referring to the programme of *Rhet.* I,4–14, where Aristotle deals with the sources of enthymemes according to the three kinds of speeches. But we have seen that these sources demonstrably include the *τόποι*. It seems strange to suppose that Aristotle would include the *τόποι* in the discussion of *εἶδη* if he took them to be two different sources. In fact, however, Aristotle never indicates that *εἶδη* are the subject matter of *Rhet.* I,4–14. Rather, as noted above, he characterizes the subject matter of these chapters as *δόξαι καὶ προτάσεις* (“opinions and premisses”) pertaining to individual kinds of rhetoric.⁵⁰ In the last sentence of the Passage he provides another description of the subject matter:

Let us start, however, by capturing the kinds of rhetoric, so that, having determined how many they are, we may separately capture the elements and premisses pertaining to them.⁵¹

“Elements and premisses”: We have already seen that the name “elements” is applied to two things in the *Rhetoric*: definitions and *τόποι*. I submit that both are included in the discussion of enthymemes pertaining to the individual kinds of rhetoric. In the course of this discussion, definitions and premisses derived therefrom are always presented first. I propose that these items, viz definitions and premisses peculiar to ethics – and to the more differentiated types of objects it deals with – are those referred to as *εἶδη*. Apart from them, the arsenal of rhetorical premisses pertaining to the three kinds of speeches is also equipped with those discovered by a specifically rhetorical or dialectical expertise, namely by means of *τόποι*.⁵²

⁴⁹ *Rhet.* I,4 1358a32–33: πρότερον οὖν εἴπωμεν περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν.

⁵⁰ *Rhet.* II,1 1377b16–20; II,18 1391b22–27.

⁵¹ I,2 1358a33–35: πρῶτον δὲ λάβωμεν τὰ γένη τῆς ῥητορικῆς, ὅπως διελόμενοι πόσα ἐστίν, περὶ τούτων χωρὶς λαμβάνωμεν τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ τὰς προτάσεις.

⁵² The reason why *εἶδη* are dealt with *first* seems to be this: they provide the material from which the specifically rhetorical premisses – about the more and the less, the possible and the impossible, etc. – are generated by means of *τόποι*. – The first draft of this paper was presented at the SEAAP workshop on Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, I,1–6, organized by Jakub Jirsa, which took place in Prague in November 22–23, 2018. I’m grateful to the participants of the workshop, especially Christof Rapp and Klaus Corcilus, for useful comments. Further thanks are due to the anonymous reader for *Eirene*, who helped me improve the text in several places.

Abbreviations

- A Parisinus 1741, 10th c.
F Cantabrigiensis 1298, 12/13th c.

Bibliography

- COPE, E. M. 1867, *Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric*, London - Cambridge.
COPE, E. M. 1877, *Aristotle: Rhetoric*, I, Revised by J. E. SANDYS, Cambridge.
GRIMALDI, W. 1958, "The Aristotelian topics", *Traditio*, 14, pp. 1-16.
GRIMALDI, W. 1980, *Aristotle, Rhetoric I: A Commentary*, New York.
KASSEL, R. 1976, *Aristotelis Ars Rhetorica*, Berlin - New York.
MARX, F. 1900, "Aristoteles Rhetorik", *Berichte über die Verhandlungen der Königlich Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig. Philologisch-Historische Klasse*, 52/6, pp. 241-328.
RAPP, C. 2002, *Aristoteles, Rhetorik*, I-II, Berlin.
RAPP, C. 2010, "Aristotle's Rhetoric", in: E. N. ZALTA (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2010 Edition). <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/aristotle-rhetoric/>>.
RAPP, C. 2016, "Dialectic and Logic from a Rhetorical Point of View", in: J.-B. GOURINAT - J. LEMAIRE (eds.), *Logique et dialectique dans l'antiquité*, Paris, pp. 161-191.
ROSS, W. D. 1959, *Aristotelis Ars Rhetorica*, Oxford.
RUBINELLI, S. 2009, *Ars Topica: The Classical Technique of Constructing Arguments from Aristotle to Cicero*, Dordrecht.
SCHRADER, C. 1674, *De Rhetoricorum Aristotelis sententia et usu commentarius*, Helmstedt.
SOLMSEN, F. 1929, *Die Entwicklung der aristotelischen Logik und Rhetorik*, Berlin.
SPENGLER, L. 1867, *Aristotelis Ars rhetorica*, II, Leipzig.

Summary

Contrary to the current *communis opinio*, this paper argues that Aristotle does not distinguish between common and specific *topoi* in the *Rhetoric*. Rather, he distinguishes two sources of rhetorical deductions, one of them being *topoi* and the other definitions or definition-like accounts. Whereas the knowledge of *topoi* belongs to the expertise of a rhetor or a dialectician, definitions properly belong to specific arts and sciences. In *Rhet.* I,4-15, Aristotle deals with *both* sources (referred to as “elements”) in view of the three kinds of rhetoric – deliberative, epideictic, and juridical – and provides a list of premisses pertaining to each of these kinds, always starting with those based on definitions.

Keywords: enthymemes; *topoi*; definitions; premisses

MATYÁŠ HAVRDA
Czech Academy of Sciences
Institute of Philosophy
Jilská 1, Prague 1, 110 00
Czech Republic
havrda@flu.cas.cz

